



# INTERIM REPORT

Art. 16.2 Law 4033/2011 (art. 14.2 Directive 2009/18/EC)

## MARINE ACCIDENT SAFETY INVESTIGATION

Fire on Ro-Ro cargo “MED STAR” CYPRUS FLAG IMO 7528659

### Serious marine casualty

JUNE 2018

**Marine casualty  
Safety Investigation  
Law 4033/2011 as amended and  
applies**

(summary extract of art. 1.b, 4.1.a  
& 4.1.b)

The conduct of Safety Investigations into marine casualties or incidents is independent from criminal, discipline, administrative or civil proceedings whose purpose is to apportion blame or determine liability. The sole objective of the conduct of a safety investigation is to ascertain the circumstances that caused the marine accident or incident through analysis, to draw useful conclusions and lessons learned that may lead, if necessary, to safety recommendations or proposals addressed to parties or stakeholders involved in order to take remedial actions, aiming to prevent or avoid future marine accidents.

**Points of Interest**

- This Interim Report has been prepared by virtue of art. 16.2 Law 4033/2011, as applies (art. 14.2 Directive 2009/18/EC) as the full investigation report will not be published within 12 months of the marine accident date.
- The Interim Report has been published for the sole purposes of the safety investigation process with no litigation in mind and should be inadmissible to any judicial or other proceedings (administrative, disciplinary, criminal or civil) whose purpose is to attribute or apportion blame or liability.
- The Interim Report only aims to present a concise summary of the events occurred on the 15<sup>th</sup> of June 2017 that led to a serious marine accident.
- The Interim Report does not constitute legal advice in any way and should not be construed as such.

HBMCI conducts the safety investigation of issued marine casualty as the Lead Investigating State. The content of this Interim Report is based on current available information and data collected and analyzed during the safety investigation process into captioned marine casualty. The completion of the procedure as defined in relevant legislation may reveal or identify new information, data or evidence and consequently cause changes or amendments in data provided by this Interim Report. All times quoted are local times unless otherwise stated.

**Marine accident synopsis**

Ro-Ro Cargo “MED STAR”, was engaged in regular commercial scheduled service in the Aegean Sea. More specifically at the period of the marine casualty the vessel was trading between the ports of Rhodes-Thira-Piraeus. On 15<sup>th</sup> July 2017, after loading operations had been completed at the port of Rhodes, the vessel departed at approximately 21:00 with a cargo of 33 empty trucks, 2 refrigerator trucks loaded with fish, 2 truck drivers, and a crew complement of 30, for her next destination port.

At approximately 21:20, while MED STAR was sailing at the sea area near the north-west tip of Rhodes at a distance of almost 2nm from the port, a fire broke out near the auxiliary machinery located at the port side main engine inside the engine room. The fire was spotted by the Chief Electrician and the Chief Engineer who at that time were patrolling inside the engine room and it was described as intense flame and smoke coming out from the left side area of the port side main engine extended to the adjacent auxiliary equipment. At the same time the fire detection system was activated in the bridge, indicating fire inside the engine room, while a few moments later the chief engineer, who rushed immediately inside the engine control room, alerted the master on the bridge, by using the internal communication system. The Master directed the vessel for anchorage near the coast at the NW tip of Rhodes, in order to avoid drifting and focused all efforts to firefighting.

The chief engineer shut off the engines and isolated the fuel supply system, while the electrician stopped the ventilation system from the main control panel inside the engine. All engine crew evacuated the engine room. A first attempt was made by the engine crew to fight the fire via the ventilation ducts using portable fire extinguishers, but without success due to the intense smoke and heat in the affected area. The fire and watertight doors were closed. In parallel the Master alerted the crew through the public address system and the fire extinguishing and lifeboat preparation teams were summoned at the master station, near the port side lifeboat behind the bridge. After power supply was cut-off at the engine room, the emergency generator had started automatically providing power for the emergency fire pump.

Firefighting equipment was deployed and fire teams started fighting the fire, using fire hoses, targeting the chimney and through the air vents of the port and starboard side funnels as well as the ventilation ducts of the upper garage deck. The high-fog system was also engaged locally by the chief engineer. Moreover the lifeboats were prepared for launching if needed.

The master reported the situation to the local Coast Guard authority of Rhodes as well as the Piraeus Joint Search and Rescue Coordination Center and the vessel’s managing company, as well as to the vessel’s flag. The local port authority took over the coordination of the rescue operations remaining in contact with the vessel for any assistance might be needed and deploying all available means. Three tugs responding to the emergency call, approached the vessel and assisted with the firefighting operations.

At approximately 21:50, the Master informed the local port authority that 18 crew members and the two truck drivers, were about to abandon the vessel and the firefighting operations would be continued by the remaining crew on board. At 22:40, twenty people were successfully transferred to shore with the assistance of the local HCG patrol craft. At approximately 23:40 the Master reported that the fire was under control and approximately two hours and ten minutes later that it was fully extinguished. The vessel remained at the same position for monitoring and accessing the situation. The company signed an LOF agreement and two salvage tugs arrived at the scene to provide towage assistance. Towage operations started at approximately 12:30 on 17<sup>th</sup> June 2017 and the vessel was safely berthed at the port at 13:40 on the same day. Unloading operations were also conducted the same day. On 18<sup>th</sup> June 2017 MED STAR was granted permission and sailed under towage for Salamis area in Piraeus port where she arrived on 20<sup>th</sup> June 2017 for the necessary repairs. The fire caused local damages to the port side main engine area whereas upper decks were not affected. No pollution and no injuries were reported.

Investigation	Final safety Investigation Report
<p>The undergoing safety Investigation and analysis so far highlighted the origin of the fire coming from the mechanical self cleaning filters of the lub oil system in the port side main engine. Other contributing factors under investigation include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The maintenance and monitoring of the relative equipment in engine room.</li> <li>• Lack of proper training and familiarization of the engine crew personnel regarding the high fog system, and others as will be mentioned in the final investigation report.</li> </ul>	<p>A draft safety Investigation report is under preparation and will be circulated to involved and interested parties for consultation according to the provisions of regulation 1286/2011/EC.</p>



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## FACTUAL INFORMATION

### SHIPS PARTICULARS

Name	MED STAR
Flag	CYPRUS
Port and number of Registry	LIMASSOL
Ship's type	RO-RO CARGO
IMO	7528659
Call sign	5BPY4
LOA	151 m
Breadth	23,62 m
Year of built	1978
Shipyard	HYUNDAI HEAVY INDUSTRIES Co LTD
Construction	Steel
Gross Tonnage	16776 Tons
Net Tonnage	5032 Tons
Engine / Power	Two internal combustion engines/ 11470kW
Classification Society	Registro Italiano Navale (RINA)
Minimum Safe Manning	18

### Voyage Particulars

Date of departure	29 November 2014 /Rodes—Greece
Trading Area	World wide
Cargo on board	33 trucks—2 refrigerator trucks—2 truck drivers
Crew on board	30

### Marine Casualty Information

Date & time	15/06/2017 at 21:30lt
Type of marine casualty	Serious marine casualty
Weather & environmental conditions	Wind force 3 bfrs E - sea state very good –visibility good.
Location of casualty	2 nm west from northern tip of Rodes Island – Lat.36° 27,7' N – Long. 28° 15,49' E
Damages to ship	Local damages at port side main engine area and adjacent spaces
Fatalities / injuries / pollution	None /none/none

### RO-RO CARGO “MED STAR”

