



**Marine casualty
Safety Investigation**

**Law 4033/2011 as amended and
applies**

(summary extract of art. 1.b, 4.1.a
& 4.1.b)

The conduct of Safety Investigations into marine casualties or incidents is independent from criminal, discipline, administrative or civil proceedings whose purpose is to apportion blame or determine liability. The sole objective of the conduct of a safety investigation is to ascertain the circumstances that caused the marine accident or incident through analysis, to draw useful conclusions and lessons learned that may lead, if necessary, to safety recommendations or proposals addressed to parties or stakeholders involved in order to take remedial actions, aiming to prevent or avoid future marine accidents.

Points of Interest

- This Interim Report has been prepared by virtue of art. 16.2 Law 4033/2011, as applies (art. 14.2 Directive 2009/18/EC) as the full investigation report will not be published within 12 months of the marine accident date.
- The Interim Report has been published for the sole purposes of the safety investigation process with no litigation in mind and should be inadmissible to any judicial or other proceedings (administrative, disciplinary, criminal or civil) whose purpose is to attribute or apportion blame or liability.
- The Interim Report only aims to present a concise summary of the events occurred on the 11th of February 2015 that led to a very serious marine accident.
- The Interim Report does not constitute legal advice in any way and should not be construed as such.

INTERIM REPORT

Art. 16.2 Law 4033/2011 (art. 14.2 Directive 2009/18/EC)

MARINE ACCIDENT SAFETY INVESTIGATION

Grounding of B/C "GOODFAITH" CYPRUS FLAG IMO 9076404

Very Serious marine casualty

February 2016

HBMCI conducts the safety investigation of issued marine casualty as the Lead Investigating State. The content of this Interim Report is based on current available information and data collected and analyzed during the safety investigation process into captioned marine casualty.

The completion of the procedure as defined in relevant legislation may reveal or identify new information, data or evidence and consequently cause changes or amendments in data provided by this Interim Report.

All times quoted are local times unless otherwise stated.

INCHE INEBOLU's positing data as presented in the interim report are based on AIS electronic evidence obtained from the Hellenic Coast Guard AIS System (Integrated Marine Data Environment (IMDatE), a technical framework that collects and incorporates data from EMSA's maritime applications and other external sources), as well as vessel's VDR data.

Marine accident synopsis

M/V Goodfaith under Cyprus Flag was a Bulk carrier engaged in international trade. On the 10th of February 2015 she had sailed from Elefsis/Greece in ballast condition heading to Odessa /Ukraine for loading, with 22 crew members. On the previous day, she had just completed her special survey maintenance operations at Elefsis shipyard and was inspected by her Class. The voyage plan projected on her navigational charts included standard passages that are followed by vessels trading between ports of the Mediterranean Sea, Marmaras Sea and Black Sea. Goodfaith would gradually reach and pass through Kafireas Strait (between south of Evia Island and Andros Island) and would progressively head towards Dardanelles Strait, Marmaras Sea, Bosphorus Strait and Black Sea.

On 10 February 2015, The National Meteorological Service had issued a gale warning that forecasted N winds 8-9 bfrs, gusts to 10 bfrs and wave height of 5.5 m - 7 m.

Goodfaith, having exited Piraeus Traffic Separation Scheme, commenced her voyage at open sea running at 13 knots and steering was in autopilot.

At approximately 1600, while she was entering Keas Strait, the Master ordered to set steering in manual mode and the "rough seas" mode was activated to avoid critical main engine overspeed, as she was encountering heavy pitching and rolling due to the prevailing bad weather conditions, winds force 7-8 Bfrs and high waves. By that time, Goodfaith was running at an average speed of 6-7 knots. At approximately 1930, while the 3rd Officer was on the watch, the weather conditions, that had significantly worsen to strong gale (N winds force 9 bfrs), had a severe continuous impact on Goodfaith's navigation, on the grounds that she was making a slow progress on her passage although engine was set to full ahead, sailing at an average speed of 3-4 knots and struggling to heave to Kafireas Strait by keeping the charted 030° heading course. At approximately 2130, while Goodfaith entered Kafireas Strait and had to sail about 8nm to its exit, her speeds had been greatly reduced and were recorded between 1.5 and 2.5 knots.

At 2400, the 2nd Officer took over the navigational watch and having appraised the situation, called the Master at about 0015. Goodfaith could be hardly maintained steerable with her speed slightly over 2.0 knots for the reason that she was encountering severe rolling, pitching and slamming as heavy seas were breaking over her forecastle. By that time, she was about 2nm Northwest off the rocky coast of Andros Island.

The 2nd Officer reported the experiencing situation to Master, as Goodfaith had started to considerably drifting to starboard notwithstanding her rudder was set hard to port and her engine to full ahead. The Master ordered to alert the Chief Engineer and the Chief Officer and having assumed a steering failure, deployed the 2nd Officer and the AB on the watch to the emergency steering gear compartment to check its operation. The 2nd Officer hurried to the emergency steering gear and reported that he did not observe a steering failure and rudder was set hard to port.

At approximately 0045, Goodfaith was recorded to heavily drifting to leeward (starboard), almost 1nm off the NW coast of Andros Island. She was practically not under command making no headway, despite the fact that her engine was set to full ahead. The Master realizing the emergency and the imminent danger of an uncontrollable and violent grounding ordered to alert the crew and activated the general alarm. All crew members were mustered on the bridge with their life-jackets on. Due to the fact that Goodfaith was actually not under command, as no further action were taken by the Master, she was laying beam on to the wind and the high waves, 7-8 m of height as reported by her crew, that were causing uncontrollable heavy rolling. The Master considering the unmanageable emergency, deployed the Chief Officer and the Bosun to the forecastle to drop the anchors in order to limit the consequences of the anticipated grounding, nonetheless it was not possible with the encountering situation and weather conditions.

At approximately 0128, Goodfaith grounded on the rocky coastline at the Northwest seafront of Andros Island. She was stranded lengthwise with her starboard side, actually wedged on a rocky slight sloped flat reef, meters away from the coast's steep cliffs and listed about 10° to port, while huge waves were unceasingly slamming her port side, covering her deck and causing striking violent rocking. The Master urgently reported the casualty to the Coastguard Authorities and requested assistance for evacuating the vessel. A coordinated operation was immediately launched by the Hellenic Coast Guard in cooperation with the Hellenic Air Force, Fire Service Emergency Response Squad and the Civil Protection Authority. At about 0400, a S&R Super Puma Helicopter managed to hoist and rescue 18 crew members under challenging conditions as the wind was gusting from 60 to 70 knots. The Master and three more crew members remained on board and were rescued at noon hours by the Fire Service Emergency Response Squad that launched a rescue operation from the coast. Goodfaith Owners contracted a Salvage Company for the antipollution, refloating operations.

Goodfaith had sustained severe damages, heavy indentations, cracks and fractures lengthwise on her bottom; cargo holds no 1,3,4,5, forepeak tank and engine room compartments were holed and flooded; a limited pollution also occurred.

On 27 March 2015, bunkers pumping was completed as it was occasionally ceased due to prevailing bad weather conditions. It is presumed that Owners had declared Goodfaith as a total loss to respective vessel's Insurers. A Salvage Company was contracted to undertake the wreck removal. Goodfaith was cut in two sections; the stern section together with the accommodation were removed by barges; the forward section was refloated and towed to Salamis, in Greece.

On 17 October 2015, she was towed to Aliaga, in Turkey for demolition.

Investigation

The undergoing safety Investigation and analysis has highlighted contributing and underlined factors as presented in random order:

- Goodfaith navigated in light ballast under adverse weather conditions affecting her steering and maneuverability;
- The prioritization of the commercial aspect to reach the loading port in relation to safety;
- Loss of situational awareness;
- Poor bridge performance;
- Inappropriate Master's decision making;
- and others as will be included in the Final Report.

Final safety Investigation Report

A draft safety Investigation report is under preparation and is expected to be finalized shortly and circulated to involved and interested parties for consultation.



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FACTUAL INFORMATION

SHIPS PARTICULARS

Name	GOODFAITH
Flag	CYPRUS
Registry	LIMASSOL
Ship's type	BULK CARRIER
IMO	9076404
Call sign	C4SY2
LOA	165.5 m
Breath	27 m
Year of built	1994
Shipyard	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Shimonoseki, Japan
Construction	Steel
Gross Tonnage	16446Tons
Net Tonnage	9409 Tons
Engine / Power	ONE DIESEL - MITSUI MAN/B&W/5369kW
Classification Society	NIPPON KAIJI KYOKAI (NKK)
Minimum Safe Manning	12

Voyage Particulars

Date of departure	10 February 2015 Elefsis/Greece
Trading Area	International Voyages
Cargo on board	Ballast condition
Crew on board	22

Marine Casualty Information

Date & time	11/02/2015 at 01:28 LT
Type of marine casualty	Very serious marine casualty
Weather & environmental conditions	Gale warning : Wind force 8-9 bfrs N-NW, gusts up to 10 bfrs sea state very rough - poor visibility
Location of casualty	North west coast of Andros island Greece Lat.37° 58' 46" N – Long. 24° 43' 36" E
Indicative damages to ship	Forepeak TK - cargo holds 1,3,4,5 - Engine room - Bow and side shell forward stb side Double Bottom Ballast Tanks no 3, 5 Double Bottom Fuel Storage Tank no 2C, 4C
Fatalities / injuries	None
Marine pollution	YES

