



SAFETY RECOMMENDATION No: 47/2015

Text of Safety Recommendation:

Establish clear procedure to the Safety Management System Manual (SMSM), concerning navigation in heavy weather ballast condition, involving the competent department of the company when adverse weather is expected.

No of Safety Investigation Report:

07/2015: Grounding of B/C "GOODFAITH"
(See the full Report [here.](#))

Safety Recommendation addressed to:

Managers

Date of publication:

13/12/2017

Comments-Remarks:

INFORMATION OF ACCIDENT

Type of vessel: Bulk Carrier

Year of built:1994

Grounding of B/C "GOODFAITH"

Course of events

On the 10th of February 2015 the vessel had sailed from Elefsis/Greece in ballast condition heading to Odessa /Ukraine for loading, with 22 crew members. On the morning of 10th of February 2015, the National Meteorological Service had issued a storm warning at the sea area of South Evvoikos –Kafireas Strait, that forecasted N –NE winds 9-10 bfrs, and wave height of 3.5m – 6.5m. At 0000, the 2nd Officer took over the navigational watch while the Master had left from the bridge at approximately 0005. At approximately 0050 Goodfaith could hardly be maneuvered with her speed (SOG) slightly over 2.0 knots for the reason that she was encountering severe rolling, pitching and slamming as heavy seas were breaking over her forecastle. The 2nd Officer reported the experiencing situation to Master, as Goodfaith had started to considerably drift to starboard notwithstanding her rudder was set hard to port and her engine to full ahead at 120 rpm. The Master realizing the emergency and the imminent danger of an uncontrollable and violent grounding ordered to alert the crew and activated the general alarm. At approximately 0128, Goodfaith grounded on the rocky coastline at the Northwest seafront of Andros Island. Most of the crew were rescued by a Hellenic Navy helicopter and 04 remained onboard and then were rescued by shore rescue personnel.

Relevant comments on the safety recommendation

The Master's decisions were not communicated or discussed thoroughly with the rest of the bridge team and the mates did not question them. One of such decisions was to proceed to the intended voyage despite the weather predictions and the vessel's draught, being confident that Goodfaith was in a sufficient ballast condition to overcome the encountering bad weather that was lying ahead. His belief was probably strengthened by the fact that until 00:05, when he left the bridge to rest, the vessel was making an acceptable steer to course despite the heavy pitching and rolling she was experiencing. It was only after that time, when unfortunately the Master was not on the bridge, that M/V Goodfaith got fully exposed to the open sea and the deteriorating weather conditions, which affected and caused the loss of her steering, ultimately forcing her to drift sideways towards the coast. Additionally commercial time constraints and environmental factors had not permitted the ballasting of the vessel after dry dock surveys had been concluded, and are also considered as a contributing factor to the marine casualty.

Extent of damage

M/V Goodfaith had sustained severe damages, heavy indentations, cracks and fractures lengthwise on her bottom and side shell plating, including underwater hull damages in her fore section, cargo holds and engine room. It was apparent that the repair costs exceeded the insured value of the vessel therefore she was considered a constructive total loss. M/V Goodfaith was towed on the 10th of July 2015 from Andros to a shipyard facility in Salamis island (Greece) until her final destination to the demolition yard for its disposal on the 17th of October 2015.



Photos from the SAR operation and the vessel being removed from the casualty area

Conclusion led to safety recommendation

- The insufficient ballast condition of M/V Goodfaith, under the prevailing bad weather conditions is considered a contributing factor to the examined marine casualty.
- The Master had remained at the bridge from the start of the voyage until 0005 when Goodfaith had almost cleared the strait. The Master remained on the bridge to personally supervise the vessel's passage through Kafireas strait since he was clearly concerned having in mind the usual marine traffic in those areas and the prevailing bad weather conditions. However for the most part of the watches the officers had little input or interaction with the Master apart from responding to his orders.
- The poor bridge resource management in relation to technical resources and bridge team communication is considered to have been a contributing factor to the examined case.