



SAFETY RECOMMENDATION No: 46/2015

Text of Safety Recommendation:

Provide clear guidelines to the Masters highlighting the importance of clear and specific Night Orders to the O(s)OW, when navigating in coastal areas under adverse weather conditions, concerning the frequent position fixing with alternative methods and the acceptable drifting from the planned course.

No of Safety Investigation Report:

07/2015: Grounding of B/C "GOODFAITH"
(See the full Report [here.](#))

Safety Recommendation addressed to:

Managers

Date of publication:

13/12/2017

Comments-Remarks:

INFORMATION OF ACCIDENT

Type of vessel: Bulk Carrier

Year of built:1994

Grounding of B/C "GOODFAITH"

Course of events

On the 10th of February 2015 the vessel had sailed from Elefsis/Greece in ballast condition heading to Odessa /Ukraine for loading, with 22 crew members. On the morning of 10th of February 2015, the National Meteorological Service had issued a storm warning at the sea area of South Evvoikos –Kafireas Strait, that forecasted N –NE winds 9-10 bfrs, and wave height of 3.5m – 6.5m. At 0000, the 2nd Officer took over the navigational watch while the Master had left from the bridge at approximately 0005. At approximately 0050 Goodfaith could hardly be maneuvered with her speed (SOG) slightly over 2.0 knots for the reason that she was encountering severe rolling, pitching and slamming as heavy seas were breaking over her forecastle. The 2nd Officer reported the experiencing situation to Master, as Goodfaith had started to considerably drift to starboard notwithstanding her rudder was set hard to port and her engine to full ahead at 120 rpm. The Master realizing the emergency and the imminent danger of an uncontrollable and violent grounding ordered to alert the crew and activated the general alarm. At approximately 0128, Goodfaith grounded on the rocky coastline at the Northwest seafront of Andros Island. Most of the crew were rescued by a Hellenic Navy helicopter and 04 remained onboard and then were rescued by shore rescue personnel.

Relevant comments on the safety recommendation

Had the OOW acknowledged the rate of the vessel's drift from the planned course and realized in time that the vessel was approaching the rocky coast he would have called the Master at an earlier stage on the bridge where other appropriate actions could have been considered in order to avoid the grounding.

Extent of damage

M/V Goodfaith had sustained severe damages, heavy indentations, cracks and fractures lengthwise on her bottom and side shell plating, including underwater hull damages in her fore section, cargo holds and engine room. It was apparent that the repair costs exceeded the insured value of the vessel therefore she was considered a constructive total loss. M/V Goodfaith was towed on the 10th of July 2015 from Andros to a shipyard facility in Salamis island (Greece) until her final destination to the demolition yard for its disposal on the 17th of October 2015.



Photos from the SAR operation and the vessel being removed from the casualty area

Conclusions led to safety recommendation

- The Master left the bridge without fully appraising the vessel's navigational behavior after exiting the Steno Kafireas and proceeding to the open Central Aegean Sea in order to provide sufficient instruction to the OOW regarding the monitoring of the vessel's actual course. Consequently the increase of the actual course deviation was not observed.
- Disregard of standard navigational procedures concerning the monitoring phase of the passage planning allowed the OOW to remain inactive for a period of time and increased the potential to lose his continuous and accurate positional awareness.
- The analysis of the S-VDR data had revealed that at least until 0050, when the vessel's heading started to increase to starboard, and in fact never returned back to the original course, the OOW had not realized that the vessel was drifting affected by the strong waves and winds, despite the increase of COG. When Master had ultimately arrived on the bridge, M/V Goodfaith was 2 nm away from the rocky coast of Andros island.
- The lack of specific instructions in the Master's Night Orders concerning the frequency of the vessel's position fixing during the watch is considered as a contributing factor in the marine accident.
- The Master's performance was also affected by fatigue that was accumulated progressively during his stay at the bridge.