



## SAFETY RECOMMENDATION No: 46/2013

### **Text of Safety Recommendation:**

Re-examine the way to secure the “Ω” (omega) ring, that holds in place the wire of the reverse control mechanism to the control unit’s housing, in terms of avoiding its loosening due to vibrations that derive from the vessel’s normal operation.

Examine in parallel, the necessity of adding the maximum allowed time period between the control unit’s checks, in the “Installation, Operations and Maintenance Manual”.

In case of employing measures in terms of the above, examine the necessity of notifying accordingly the owners of the crafts/ships that have already installed and operate on board the specific type of control unit.

<b>No of Safety Investigation Report:</b>	07/2013: Impact of M/T “MANTOUDI” with the pier (See the full Report <a href="#">here.</a> )
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<b>Safety Recommendation addressed to:</b>	Manufacturing company of the vessel’s control unit
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<b>Date of publication:</b>	09/04/2015
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### **Comments-Remarks:**

## **INFORMATION OF ACCIDENT**

Type of vessel: M/T

Year of built: 1965

### **Impact of M/T with the pier**

### **Course of events**

The M/T at the process of approaching the Cruise ship in the marine region of Xaveri Coast, inside the Central Port of Piraeus, for bunkering operation had a Main Engine control system malfunction, which resulted to her impact with the pier No 3 of the Central Port of Piraeus

(Xaveri Coast) and her contact with the Cruise ship. The weather conditions that prevailed during the accident were very good and there was almost no wind.



**Picture 1:** View of the area of Pier No.3 (Xaveri Coast) in the Central Port of Piraeus. The positions of the ships involved, SEABOURNSPIRIT (red) and MANTOUDI (white - blue) are shown (without the use of a scale) as follows:

- 1: MANTOUDI approach for mooring to SEABOURNSPIRIT
  - 2: MANTOUDI not able to reduce speed
  - 3: MANTOUDI impacts with the jetty
- (Map Source: Google Maps)

From the impact neither pollution nor any injury occurred, only damages to the M/T and scratches on the port side of the Cruise ship, above the water-line. Following an inspection of the damage of the M/T and the partial temporary restoration of them, the realization of the bunkering operation was approved and after that the M/T sailed under her own power for a nearby shipyard for the complete restoration of the damages. The Cruise ship sailed in the afternoon of the same day and continued her planned voyage.

### **Extent of damage**

The M/T sustained a crack at the tank top of the Fore Peak Tank, buckling and cracking of stiffeners inside the Fore Peak Tank and buckling of the central longitudinal bulkhead, buckling of the hull plate at a height of 0,50m above the waterline, cracking at the top of said buckling and deformation of the railings on the bridge deck on the starboard side.

The Cruise ship had minor scratches at her port side above the waterline.



**Pictures 2, 3:** The damages of the M/T externally (left: fore part, right: railings on the starboard bridge deck)

### **Probable cause**

The malfunction of the of the Main Engine's remote control system at the bridge caused by the loosening of the control head cable "Ω" type fastener screws, probably from the effect of the vibrations presented during the ship's operation.

The same malfunction of the remote control system of the main engine had occurred one month before the examined accident, and had contributed to the decision for the replacement of the control system with a new one which was installed by the ship's Engineer and by her Owner, according to the manufacturer's instructions (manual).

During the incident, the operation of the main engine's controller locally inside the engine room was not carried out, due to the fact that the deck personnel was reduced since a Bridge Officer (2<sup>ND</sup> Governor grade) was absent and the presence of the Engineer at the ship's main deck, amidships for the placement of a fender was deemed necessary, instead of being in the engine room where he should be, in order to identify and confront any malfunctions.



**Picture 4:** View of the direction drive control lever where the indicative position lights are shown (inside the red circle)



**Picture 5:** View of the lower part of the control system where the cables towards the engine room have been marked.

- 1: Main Engine direction control cable
- 2: Main Engine revolutions control cable

### Lessons to be learned

Re-examine the way to secure the “ $\Omega$ ” (omega) ring, that holds in place the wire of the reverse control mechanism to the control unit’s housing, in terms of avoiding its loosening due to vibrations that derive from the vessel’s normal operation.

Examine in parallel, the necessity of adding the maximum allowed time period between the control unit’s checks, in the “Installation, Operations and Maintenance Manual”.

In case of employing measures in terms of the above, examine the necessity of notifying accordingly the owners of the crafts/ships that have already installed and operate on board the specific type of control unit.