



SAFETY RECOMMENDATION No: 20/2014

Text of Safety Recommendation:

Consider the provisions foreseen under Res. A.1047(27) for establishing Minimum Manning Levels of Flagged vessels, concerning the minimum standards of competency as specified in STCW Code (*performance of the functions at the appropriate levels of responsibility*) for ratings under Group 2, as has been identified in Ince Inebolu's Minimum Safe Manning Document.

No of Safety Investigation Report:	02/2014: Grounding of B/C "INCE INEBOLU" (See the full Report here.)
Safety Recommendation addressed to:	The Competent Authority of the Shipping Administration for issuing Minimum Safe Manning Document
Date of publication:	31/12/2015

Comments-Remarks:

INFORMATION OF ACCIDENT

Type of vessel: Bulk Carrier
Year of built:11/2002

Grounding of B/C "INCE INEBOLU"

Course of events

On 30 August 2014, Ince Inebolu had sailed from Hodeidah/Yemen, located in the Red Sea, with 22 crew members on board, in ballast condition heading to Novorossiysk/Russia for loading. Following her passage plan, she exited Suez Canal and continued her passage at open sea towards Canakkale Strait.

By that time cargo cleaning operations had been deployed, engaging almost all deck ratings, including the ABs forming part of the navigational watch. On 05 September 2014, at approximately 0000, the Second Officer took over the navigational watch (0000 – 0400). The watch handover was carried out without any particular navigational remarks, steering was in autopilot heading to 318° while Ince Inebolu was running at about 13 knots and no look out watch was posted. However slight changes to Ince Inebolu course were recorded due to drifting. The investigation process showed that probably from 0130 or shortly after, the Second Officer was not monitoring her passage as the vessel's positions were not plotted on the navigational chart and at approximately 0200 and he fell asleep. According to AIS information, the last selected course that was set by autopilot, was maintained throughout the 2nd Officer's navigational watch.

According to crew reports, on 03 September, during the Suez Canal crossing, the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) had been deactivated and it had not been reactivated since then. At approximately 0405 Ince Inebolu while running at approximately 13 knots, grounded on the south east rocky coastline of Astypalaia Island-Greece. At the time of the marine casualty the relieving Navigational Officer had not been called for duty. Weather conditions were reported to be very good (wind force 2-3 bfrs, sea state calm with very good visibility) and it was still dark.

Relevant comments on the safety recommendation

- The deck department Minimum Safe Manning requirements, were divided in two "Groups", that is "group 1", comprising the ratings of Ordinary Seaman, Able Seaman and Boatswain and "group 2", comprising the ratings of Deck Rating and Deck Boy, as marked under the "Special Requirements and Conditions" note of the issued Minimum Safe Manning Document.
- "Group 2" was counting ratings that were not based "on performance of the functions at the appropriate levels of responsibility, as specified in STCW Code", meaning the "Mandatory minimum requirements for certification of ratings as able seafarer deck", under Section A-II/5 that establishes the minimum standards of competence of ratings as able seafarer deck.
- In consideration of the above, the provisions foreseen in Res. A.1047(27), as generally presented in previous paragraph (4.8.1), were not taken in full regard.



Grounding point of Ince Inebolu at Astypalaia Island.



Ince Inebolu anchored at Astypalaia.

Extent of damage

Due to the heavy impact on the rocky coastline, several compartments of her bow section were damaged to an extent of about 21 m of length longitudinally. More specific the damages reported to be cracks and hull plating deformation at forepeak tank, collision bulkhead, No. 1 cargo Hold, No 1 port and starboard ballast tanks. No injuries and no pollution was reported.



Deformed starboard fore bottom section.



The crack at inner bottom plate of No 1 cargo hold.

Marine casualty probable causes

The safety investigation and analysis highlighted the following main contributing and underlined factors that led to the marine casualty as presented in random order:

- Absence of posted look out at the night watch;
- The OOW fell asleep due to fatigue;
- The Bridge Watch Navigation Alarm (BNWAS) was switched off, and the main Navigational equipment were ineffectively being used.

Safety recommendation conclusion

The provisions foreseen in Res. A.1047(27) in relation to the establishment of the minimum safe manning were not taken in full regard in relation to the *“performance of the functions at the appropriate levels of responsibility”* as specified in STCW Code”.

