



SAFETY RECOMMENDATION No: 01/2018

Text of Safety Recommendation:

The Managing Company, is recommended to Instruct its crews to use proper marine terminology in ship's common working language during critical operations such as mooring, navigation, cargo or bunker transfer etc. When third parties are involved in the aforementioned critical operations, any verbal communication done by them, if not in English, must be repeated forthwith in English for Master's and crew full understanding

No of Safety Investigation Report:

01/2018: Parting of a mooring rope of M/T "BYZANTION", flag GREECE, IMO 9315898 during unmooring operation resulting to the death of an O/S, Philippine nationality at Dortyol, Turkey on 7th June 2018

(See the full Report [here](#))

Safety Recommendation addressed to:

The Owners / Managers of the ship

Date of publication:

31/12/2018

Comments-Remarks:

INFORMATION OF ACCIDENT

Type of vessel: M/T
Year of built: 2007

Parting of a mooring rope of M/T "BYZANTION", flag GREECE, IMO 9315898 during unmooring operation resulting to the death of an O/S, philippine nationality at Dortyol

Course of events

On the 5th of June 2018 at 16:12 M/T BYZANTION arrived in laden condition and anchored at the port of Dortyol, Turkey, awaiting berthing instructions. On the following morning, 6th June, the mooring operation at the terminal was executed and was completed at 07:30. The vessel's discharging operation commenced at 10:12 and was completed on the following day, 07th June, at 17:00. The Port Pilot for the unberthing operation boarded at 19:14 and the 2 Tug Boats were fasted at the vessel's port side.

The unmooring operation commenced at 19:20 and shortly after, at 19:24 one mooring line at the stbd

side aft parted, injuring one crew member of BYZANTION (O/S, Philippine nationality). The operation was paused and the casualty was transferred ashore by the T/B KAPTAN BURHANETTIN OZBILEN. Despite the medical treatment provided, the injured crew member passed away. Following the parting of the mooring line and the injury of the O/S, the 2nd Officer who was in charge of the aft unmooring team turned the casualty steadily on his back and started performing CPR. Less than one minute later the Master and the Port Pilot reached the casualty area and the resuscitation efforts were continued. The Master returned to the bridge and informed the ship's Managing Company and the agent representatives at the terminal.

At 19:48 the injured person was secured on a stretcher and with the use of the ship's aft stbd crane was



Figure1: M/T BYZANTION

lowered at the deck of T/B "KAPTAN BURHANETTIN OZBILEN" which transferred him to the shore, where an ambulance received him. Unfortunately the victim succumbed to his traumas as was announced to the Master approximately one hour after the accident. The unberthing operation which was resumed at 19:50, was finally completed at 20:12. BYZANTION proceeded to the Dorytol anchorage where the competent Authorities (Coroner, Coast Guard) boarded her. The vessel's agent and P&I surveyor also boarded, as well as her Company's marine manager, the following noon.

On the 8th of June, at 22:00 BYZANTION received port clearance and sailed at 23:30. She arrived at Piraeus anchorage on 13th June, where one HBMCI Investigating Team consisting of 2 Investigators boarded her. The discharging operation was completed on the 7th of June at 17:00 and the Port pilot boarded BYZANTION at 19:14. Following the Pilot's instructions, 2 Tug Boats had been assigned for the unberthing operation. Both Tug Boats were fasted at the fore and the mid section of the vessel's port side and the operation commenced at 19:20. During the unmooring operation and while the Tug Boats were towing the vessel by her port side, one mooring line at the stbd stern which had not yet been slackened parted, resulting to the fatal injury of one O/S, member of the stern unmooring team.

Consequences (to individuals, environment , property)

The part of the mooring line remaining connected to the drum whiplashed and hit one O/S, who was member of the aft unmooring team, at his back, at the lower part of the cervical curve, injuring him severely. Despite the resuscitation efforts performed both onboard BYZANTION and at shore by competent personnel, the victim succumbed to his traumas.

No other injuries or damages to the ship were reported.



Figure2: The rope's breaking point at the part that remained onboard (left part of the photo) and at the part that remained on the terminal's bollard (right part of the photo).

Conclusions

1. The selection of the 2nd Officer as head of the aft unmooring team was premature, given his lack of previous experience on vessels of BYZANTION's size and his short familiarization period with such ship's operations. .
2. From the Brake Holding Test carried out onboard after the casualty, on 13th June 2018, the proper adjustment of the mooring winch brake was verified. Although the possibility of an improper adjustment of the brake tightening screw during the casualty cannot be excluded, no evidence of malfunction of the system was found during the investigation.
3. No records regarding the reversal date of the mooring line that parted were kept onboard BYZANTION.
4. The last inspection of all vessel's mooring lines prior to the casualty, as per the records provided during the investigation, had been carried out on 5th June 2018. Their condition had been evaluated as "Very Good" by the Officers who had conducted the inspection. From the visual inspection of the 2 parts of the broken mooring line, after the casualty, no signs of wear that would render it not acceptable for its use, were evident.
5. The parted mooring rope's physical and mechanical properties were found to be significantly inferior to the ones expected according to the document presented as its "Test Certificate". The fact that at the Tensile Test the rope parted at a load of 33.96 tn in laboratory circumstances, suggests that the breaking load of that rope under dynamically acting forces would be significantly

reduced. This parameter is explanatory of the non-function of BYZANTION's Mooring Winch Brake rendering, as the examined mooring rope, due to its dynamic loading, probably broke prior to its loading up to 30.6 tn, which was the Mooring Winch Brake limit.

6. The non-authenticity of the document presented as "Test Certificate" of the parted rope was verified. HBMCI issued a relevant "EARLY SAFETY ALERT", raising awareness to all interested parties, in order to recognize the document shown also in Appendix 1 of this report as Non authentic and therefore not to consider the data contained in it as true.
7. The ad hoc selection by the Managing Company of a supplier for the mooring equipment in contrast with an effective supplier Quality Management procedure, as well as the failure of BYZANTION's crew to conduct a proper verification of the supplied mooring equipment, are considered to have been contributing factors in the examined marine casualty.
8. The lack of supervision by the head of the Aft Unmooring Team regarding his team member's dangerous position, as well as the victim's lack of situational awareness, are considered to have been contributing factors in the examined marine casualty.
9. The Master's reaction which probably deterred the 2/O from asking for clarifications, the failure by both Officers to use proper marine terminology and the lack of dissemination of information regarding the T/Bs' movements, critical for the unberthing operation, are considered to have been contributing factors in the examined marine casualty.
10. The failure of the involved in the unberthing operation parties to use proper marine terminology in a language perceived by all, in order the dissemination of critical information for the operation to become feasible, is considered to have been a contributing factor in the examined marine casualty.
11. The failure to apply risk control measures already provided by the risk assessment procedure is considered to have been a contributing factor in the examined marine casualty.